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Abstract
In this paper, we construct a simplied general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE)
model, in which Smith's (1776) famous theory of division of labor is embedded. In
the absence of labor market integration with trading countries, we show that trade
liberalization promotes a reduction of the number of rms in each country and a
deeper division of labor, thus increasing rm productivity and improving welfare. Our
model suggests a new interpretation of the trade-induced rm productivity eect.
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1 Introduction
Does trade liberalization increase rm productivity? Wagner (2012) surveys recent seminal
papers that present the relationship between trade liberalization and rm productivity. He
summarizes recent results from the studies regarding qualitative evidence as follows: \...We
can paint a big picture|exporters and importers are more productive than non-exporters
and non-importers, and they were more productive in the years before they started to
export or import (self-selection); the number of export markets served increases with rm
productivity..." By contrast, there are only a few models based on micro-foundations that
explain the trade-induced rm productivity eect.1)
In this paper, we construct a simplied general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) model
that features division of labor to suggest a new model showing the trade-induced rm
productivity eect based on a micro-foundation. This model shows that trade liberalization
promotes a reduction in the number of rms. Then, the surviving rms acquire additional
laborers who were previously employed in the exiting rms, and the increase in employment
in each surviving rm promotes a deeper division of labor and increasing rm productivity.
Finally, the welfare in each country improves. In addition, our model shows that trade
liberalization without labor market integration with trading countries promotes a reduction
in the number of rms in each country and a reduced price, because trade liberalization
increases rm productivity and the number of foreign rivals.
Division of labor is an important behavior within rms. Using the example of a pin
factory, Smith (1776) shows that a deeper division of labor increases rm productivity.2)
Later, Stigler (1951) emphasizes the division of labor dilemma as follows. \Either the
division of labor is limited by the extent of the market, and, characteristically, industries
are monopolized; or industries are characteristically competitive, and the theorem is false
or of little signicance."
To solve Stigler's (1951) dilemma, Chaney and Ossa (2013) embed the pin factory into
Krugman's (1979) monopolistic competition model and show that an increase in market
size promotes a deeper division of labor, increasing rm productivity and the number of
rms. In their framework, the division of labor level is measured by the (optimal) number
of teams on a rm's production chain. In addition, they state that an increase in the
market size is interpreted as trade liberalization, similar to Krugman (1979), and sheds
light on a new theory of the rm productivity eect that includes the trade-induced rm
productivity eects based on micro-foundations.3)
However, Chaney and Ossa (2013) analyze the only case of an increase in the number
1) The trade-induced rm productivity eect is often explained by a multi-product rm model, for ex-
ample, Eckel and Neary (2010) and Bernard et al. (2011). However, our approach diers from theirs.
2) He provides a famous example of the division of labor in the pin factory and states that \one man
draws out the wire; another straights it; a third cuts it; a forth points it; a fth grinds it at the top for
receiving the head (...)"
3) Melitz (2003) discusses that trade liberalization increases the productivity at the industry level, but
he does not show that trade liberalization increases the productivity at the rm level (i.e., the reallocation
eect). Our model cannot speak to this reallocation eect.
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of laborers to show the trade-induced rm productivity eects. In other words, they do not
consider how trade liberalization aects rm productivity without labor market integration
with trading countries. In addition, Stigler (1951) emphasizes the monopoly power of a
rm with division of labor rather than the love of variety among consumers. Hence, we
believe that a GOLE model is appropriate for analysis of the division of labor.4)
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 constructs a basic model
and derives wage, total output, optimal number of teams, and the number of rms in
equilibrium. In addition, Section 3 shows that trade liberalization promotes a reduction in
the number of rms in each country, which is a deeper division of labor, and, hence, rm
productivity and welfare is increased. Section 4 concludes. The Appendix replicates the
results of Chaney and Ossa (2013) from our model: We explicitly show that an increase in
the market size promotes a deeper division of labor and the entry of new rms.
2 Model
In this section, we consider an open economy and develop a simplied GOLE model with
the division of labor that follows the formulation by Chaney and Ossa (2013). Our GOLE
model is based on Neary (2002, 2009).
2.1 Preferences
We dene consumer behavior. The economy has one production sector and produces one
good ~x, and the price of the good is denoted as p. The number of consumers are denoted
as L(> 0), and their utility functions are identical. Consumers solve the following utility
maximization problem:5)
max
~x
u(~x) = ln ~x; (1)
s:t: p~x  I: (2)
The inverse demand function is derived from Equation (1) as follows:
p =
1
~x
; (3)
4) The reallocation eect of Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003) is not treated in this paper. We
focus only on the rm productivity eect of trade liberalization.
5) In our paper, the utility function is dened as the logarithm. Neary's (2002, 2009) utility function is
in the quadratic form. However, the economy has one production sector and one good is produced in our
setting. Therefore, this dierence does not aect our results.
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where  is the marginal utility of income. In addition, we normalize  = 1, which is
customary in studies using the GOLE approach.6)
2.2 Production
Next, we dene rm behavior. The home country trades with m(> 2) countries, which are
completely symmetric with each other. The production sector contains n rms. The rms
compete a la Cournot in the sector. The total output in rm j 2 [0; n] is denoted by myj,
and the total sector output is denoted by mx: x =
R n
0
yjdj. Wage is denoted as w. The
prot of rm j is dened as follows:
j = mpyj   c(yj)  wF; (4)
where c(yj) represents the total variable cost of rm j, and F (> 0) represents the xed
entry cost.7) In the following discussion, we assume all rms as identical, such that?
yj = y. Hence, the prot maximizing condition is derived from Equations (3) and (4), as
follows:
d
dy
=
mn  1
m2n2y
  @c(y)
@y
= 0; (5)
where ~x = mx = mny.
2.3 Division of Labor
Here, we dene production costs. The rm performs a set number of sequenced tasks to
produce a nal good. We consider an early task in the sequence as the acquisition of raw
materials. We assume that the length of the segment is normalized to 2, which is the
production chain. If tasks from 0 to !1 2 [0; 2] are performed, an intermediate good !1
is obtained. To produce the nal good, rms perform tasks ! > !1. Hence, similarly, if
the tasks from !1 to !2 2 [!1; 2] are performed, intermediate good !2 is obtained, and so
on. One complete iteration of sequenced tasks is required to produce one unit of the nal
good8).
To produce the nal goods, rms organize teams on the production chain and assign
them tasks. The number of teams in each rm is denoted as t. Each team acquires a core
competence q 2 [0; 2] on the production chain, which requires f > 0 units of labor before
teams perform their tasks. In addition, rms determine the core competence of each team
q. The labor requirements of a team that produces a unit of intermediate good !2 are
6) See Neary (2002, 2009).
7) In this paper, we only consider the free entry case, and, hence, our model describes a long-run economy.
If we do not allow free entry, then, generally, trade liberalization does not aect rm productivity and
welfare.
8) The description of the production process is similar to Dixit and Grossman (1982)
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expressed as follows:
l(!1; !2) =
1
2
Z !2
!1
jq   !jd!; (6)
where  > 0. The teams are symmetric, which implies that  and f are identical across
teams. From Equation (6), the rm's total variable cost, c, is derived as follows:
c = w
 
tf + tmy
Z 1
t
0
!d!
!
(7)
= w

tf +
myt 
1 + 

: (8)
From Equation (7), a rm derives the optimal number of teams ~t that minimizes c given y:
~t =


 + 1
my
f
 1
+1
: (9)
Substituting Equation (9) into Equation (7), the total variable cost under the optimal
number of teams, ~c, is derived as follows:
~c = wm
1
+1y
1
+1f

+1

1 + 

 
1+
: (10)
We partially dierentiate Equation (10) by y and obtain the marginal cost as follows:
the following:
@~c
@y
=
1
1 + 
wm
1
+1y
 
+1f

+1

1 + 

 
1+
: (11)
2.4 Equilibrium
From Equations (5) and (11), we obtain the following:
y =
"
mn  1
m2n2
 

1+ (1 + )
1
1+
wm
1
1+ f

1+
#1+
: (12)
The total number of workers is L. Hence, the labor market-clearing condition is derived
as follows:
L = n
"
m
1
+1y
1
1+ f

1+

1 + 

 
1+
+ F
#
: (13)
Therefore, we derive the total output of each rm Y (= my) from Equation (13) as
5
follows:
Y = my =
264 L=n  F
f

1+

1+

 
1+
375
1+
: (14)
In addition, we derive the wage w from Equations (12) and (13) as follows:
w =
mn  1
m2n
 (1 + )
L  nF : (15)
In addition, using Equations (14) and (15), the total consumption ~x is obtained as
follows:
~x = nY =
264 (L  Fn)n 
f

1+

1+

 
1+
375
1+
: (16)
Next, we consider the case of the economy that allows the free entry condition: rms
enter the sector until their prot is zero.
j = 0, mpy   w
"
m
1
+1y
1
+1f

+1

1 + 

 
1+
#
= wF: (17)
From Equation (17) and n(> 0) we derive the number of rms in equilibrium as follows:
n =
 L +
q
L22 + 4FL(1+)
m
2F
> 0: (18)
In the following section, we consider only the case of n  2.
3 Welfare and rm productivity
In this section, we analyze the rm productivity eect of trade liberalization. In the
following section, we assume that the number of rm, n, is in equilibrium. From Equation
(18), we state the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Trade liberalization reduces the number of rms.
Proof of proposition 1. From Equations (18), we immediately derive
dn
dm
=   L(1 + )
m2
q
L22 + 4FL(1+)
m
< 0: (19)
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We explain the intuition of Proposition 1. Trade liberalization implies an increase in
the number of foreign rivals. Hence, it reduces the prot of home rms, and, hence, reduces
the number of rms in the home country.
Moreover, using Proposition 1, we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Trade liberalization increases rm productivity.
Proof of proposition 2. From Equations (10), (14), and (15), we obtain
~c =
mn  1
m2n2
(1 + ): (20)
Next, if we dierentiate Equation (20) with respect to n, we obtain
d~c
dm
=
n( mn+ 2)
m3n3
+
m
n2n2
dn
dm
< 0; (21)
where dn
dm
< 0 from Proposition 1, and n( mn+ 2) < 0 from m  2 and n  2.
From Proposition 1, we know that trade liberalization reduces the number of rms in
the home country. Then, the surviving rms acquire the laborers who were employed in
the exit rms. Therefore, the increase in employment promotes a deeper division of labor,
and, hence, rm productivity increases.
Next, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Trade liberalization increases the total output in the sector and improves
welfare of all countries.
Proof of proposition 3. The total output in the sector is
~x = mny =

(L  Fn)n 
f

1+
1+
: (22)
If we dierentiate Equation (22) with respect to m, we obtain
d~x
dm
=  
264 (L  Fn)n 
f

1+

1+

 
1+
375

 (L  Fn) + Fn
n1+f

1+

1+

 
1+
 dn
dm
> 0; (23)
where dn
dm
< 0 from Proposition 1.
Moreover, if we dierentiate u with respect to m, we obtain
du
dx
 d~x
dm
> 0; (24)
where du
d~x
= 1
~x
> 0.
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We explain the intuition of Proposition 3. From Proposition 2, we know that trade lib-
eralization increases rm productivity. Therefore, an increase in rm productivity increases
the total output, and, hence, improves welfare.9)
Next, we compare the results of our model with those of Chaney and Ossa (2013). We
show that our model is able to analyze the eects of trade liberalization without labor
market integration among trading countries. By contrast, Chaney and Ossa (2013) only
analyze the eects of an increase in market size, and they interpret these eects as a natural
example of trade liberalization. However, the eect is similar to the eect of trade liber-
alization with labor market integration with trading countries. Hence, the interpretation
of our results diers from that of their results. The results of the study by Chaney and
Ossa (2013) are as follows. An increase in the market size promotes output of each rm,
a deeper division of labor, and an increase the prot of each rm. Therefore, an increase
in the market size promotes rm entry. However, without labor market integration with
trading countries, trade liberalization promotes a reduction in the number of rms, which
is revealed in our model.10)
4 Conclusion
We construct a simplied general oligopolistic equilibrium model with division of labor
and consider the eects of trade liberalization in the absence of labor market integration
with trading countries. Our model suggests a new interpretation of the trade-induced
productivity eect. The results are summarized as follows. Trade liberalization promotes
a reduction in the number of rm. Then, the surviving rms acquire laborers that were
employed by the exit rms. Hence, the surviving rms promote a deeper division of labor,
which implies increasing productivity in each rm. Therefore, trade liberalization improves
welfare in each country.
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Appendix
The purpose of this section is to replicate the results of Chaney and Ossa (2013). We show
that an increase in the market size causes an increase in the number of rms and rm
productivity.
First, from Equation (18), we obtain
dn
dL
=
  +
q
2 + 2F (1+)
mL
2F
> 0: (25)
Hence, an increase in the market size promotes entry of new rms.
Second, from Equation (20) and (25), we obtain
d~c
dL
=
(1 + )  ( mn+ 2)
m2n2
dn
dL
< 0; (26)
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where m  2, n  2, and dn
dL
> 0. Hence, an increase in the market size increases rm
productivity. The result (26) is equivalent to Proposition 2 in Chaney and Ossa (2013).
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